U.S. Congress
U.S. House of Representatives and U.S. Senate
News releases, reports, statements and associated documents from all members of the U.S. House and the U.S. Senate as well as the House and Senate leadership and House and Senate committees.
Featured Stories
Stefanik Delivers Historic Address on Antisemitism and U.S. Support for Israel at Israeli Knesset
WASHINGTON, May 19 -- Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-New York, issued the following news release:Jerusalem, Israel - Today, House Republican Conference Chairwoman Elise Stefanik delivered an address to members of the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem following an invitation from Speaker Amir Ohana highlighting how America stands with Israel and House Republicans' fight to protect Jewish students on American college campuses.
Rep. Stefanik is the highest ranking member of the House of Representatives to visit Israel since the October 7th terrorist attacks.
Watch her full address here.
Read her full address ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 19 -- Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-New York, issued the following news release: Jerusalem, Israel - Today, House Republican Conference Chairwoman Elise Stefanik delivered an address to members of the Israeli Knesset in Jerusalem following an invitation from Speaker Amir Ohana highlighting how America stands with Israel and House Republicans' fight to protect Jewish students on American college campuses. Rep. Stefanik is the highest ranking member of the House of Representatives to visit Israel since the October 7th terrorist attacks. Watch her full address here. Read her full addressbelow.
"Thank you, Speaker Ohana, for your kind introduction and for inviting me here today. Mr. Speaker, MK Moshe Tur-Paz, MK Dan Illouz, distinguished guests, and dear friends: I am profoundly honored to speak in the hallowed halls of your Knesset, in your eternal capital, the holy city of Jerusalem, at this time of historic consequence for Israel and the Jewish people.
Today, I stand before you not just as a leader in the United States Congress, but as a lifelong admirer, supporter, and true friend of Israel and the Jewish people. You see I am lucky enough to have had the privilege of traveling here many times before, but I must confess that this time feels different.
The stakes are higher. Our sense of moral, patriotic duty feels heightened, renewed.
226 days ago, we witnessed the most vicious, brutal attack on Israel and the Jewish people since the Holocaust, a barbaric terrorist attack that claimed more than 1,200 innocent lives. Civilian women, children, and the elderly were ripped from their homes and massacred. Raped -- Beheaded -- Jewish families were bound together and burned. Babies burned alive. Atrocities of humanity.
We must never forget, and we must never relent.
Israelis, Americans, and others were savagely kidnapped from their homes, beaten, tortured, and taken hostage to the terror tunnels beneath Gaza. And we must remind the world every day that there are still over 120 souls held hostage - 226 days of captivity- including Americans, held by Hamas terrorist thugs.
Let me be very clear: We will not rest until the hostages are back home.
This period calls to mind the many times forces of evil have tried to destroy Israel and the Jewish people. Since Israel's first days of existence there have been those who have sought out its destruction. You see, we saw the same eliminationist goal in 1948, during the Fedayeen raids of the 1950s and 60s, in the '67 war, the '73 war, the successive wars against Hamas in Gaza, and again, on that dark day, October 7th, 2023.
What we are witnessing today is a story of the forces of good versus evil. The forces of civilization against the forces of barbarism, of humanity versus depravity.
I want to share something I heard the writer Douglas Murray say a couple weeks ago, which I've witnessed for myself here this week: Israel chooses life. Murray is right, but let me go further. In choosing life, Israel fulfills Isaiah's prophecy, to be a light unto nations, fighting for its survival and future in one very tough neighborhood. And I get the sense and I know that the people of Israel know this.
In the week after October 7th, 360,000 Israelis reported for military duty, flying home from around the world. That's the equivalent of 20 million Americans--more Americans than served in World War II. Many of these courageous fighters are but of college age in America. What a striking comparison: Young Israelis heeding the call of duty, fighting for their families, their people, and their homeland while the pro-Hamas apologists on so-called elite campuses across America are, in a paroxysm of blood lust, cosplaying Hamas, calling for 'intifada' and genocide with signs saying 'Final Solution.' Chanting 'Death to Israel.' And chanting 'Death to America.'
We know what it must look like, but I want you to know something. Those views, though given airtime by some radical Democrat Members of Congress, those views do not reflect the views of the American people. The American people stand firmly behind you. And we're already seeing the majority in the body in which I serve, the United States Congress, fight back and turn the tide.
Let me repeat: America is firmly behind Israel and the Jewish people.
And this goes back to our nation's founding. In 1790, America's Founding Father George Washington wrote a letter to the Jews of Newport, Rhode Island, expressing America's founding impulse, a devotion to religious pluralism. He wrote that the United States would 'give to bigotry no sanction' and 'persecution no assistance.' He further wrote: 'May the Children of the Stock of Abraham, who dwell in this land, continue to merit and enjoy the good will of the other Inhabitants; while everyone shall sit in safety under his own vine and figtree, and there shall be none to make him afraid. May the father of all mercies scatter light and not darkness in our paths, and make us all in our several vocations useful here, and in his own due time and way everlastingly happy.' As long as I serve the American people, I will defend George Washington's vision of religious pluralism and freedom. Today, this means crushing antisemitism at home, and supplying the State of Israel with what it needs, when it needs it, without conditions, to achieve total victory in the face of evil.
For all of you, total victory needs no explanation. But total victory is something too many others throughout the free world fail to understand. Total victory starts--but only starts--with wiping those responsible for October 7th off the face of the earth. There can be no retrievable dignity for Hamas and its backers.
When they chose rape, the torture of civilians, and the mutilation of infants as weapons of terrorism, they left no alternative to this just war. When the genocidal zealots running Iran lobbed missiles at this very city, they removed any doubt as to their hideous intentions. Chants of 'Death to America' are not hollow slogans. They are a promise that what happened here on October 7th could happen in the United States--unless Hamas and its Jihadist accomplices are eliminated.
My country, and all countries, must stare truth in the face: This is not Israel's fight alone. It is also our fight, the West's fight. In truth, total victory is about more than responding to one attack, it's about restoring a way of life. It is about securing the Jewish State so that it no longer faces threats of annihilation from any actor, whether from Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, or any other. And it is the United States' high honor, and high responsibility, to support Israel's effort.
I have been clear at home and I will be clear here: There is no excuse for an American president to block aid to Israel - aid that was duly passed by the Congress. There is no excuse to ease sanctions on Iran, paying a $6 billion ransom to the world's leading state sponsor of terror, or to dither and hide while our friends fight for their lives. No excuse. Full stop.
That's why I'm proud to have sponsored, or backed, every measure to aid Israel that has come before the United States Congress. Every single one. It's why I, as a senior Member on the House Armed Services Committee and Intelligence Committee, we have helped secure billions of dollars for the Iron Dome, David's Sling, the Iron Beam, anti-tunneling technology, counter-UAS systems, and further development of emerging technologies--most recently in the supplemental aid package passed just last month. It's why I led the calls for the White House to speak out against the corrupt ICC.
And it's why, for years, I have been a leading proponent and partner to President Trump in his historic support for Israeli independence and security including: moving the U.S. Embassy to its rightful place in Jerusalem, the negotiation of the historic Abraham Accords, the greatest stride toward peace normalization in more than a quarter century, adopting the strategy to align the U.S. Central Command with Israel, a change that fostered daily communications with the IDF, joint exercises, and crucial coordination with British and Arab partners that helped defend against the Iranian attack, and finally, President Trump's wise decision to call out UNRWA for what it is--a hive of antisemitism--and to eliminate every dollar of its U.S. funding.
When the enemy is inside the gates of the United Nations, America must be the one to call it by its name and destroy it. President Trump understood that, and B'ezrat hashem, we will return to that strategy soon.
But you know as well as I that the enemy is inside more than just the gates of the United Nations. It is also in powerful western institutions in my country and beyond, where the virus, the vile virus of antisemitism is spreading. This is why total victory means not just physical self-defense but ideological self-defense.
As chair of the House Republican Conference, I'm proud that House Republicans have passed bipartisan resolutions in support of Israel, called out antisemitism in the halls of Congress, and brought transparency to the antisemitic propaganda pushed on American students and paid for by foreign adversaries. We have passed bills like the DETERRENT Act to ensure our foreign enemies cannot poison the minds of American students.
I also serve as a senior member of the Education and Workforce Committee, where I led the charge to expose this moral rot of antisemitism infecting our supposed most 'elite' higher education institutions. When we heard from Jewish students, faculty members, and staff about antisemitic attacks taking place on their campuses, I demanded Congress host a public hearing to hold colleges and universities accountable for their failure to combat antisemitism and their failure to protect Jewish members of their community.
And I know you all saw that hearing because the world saw that hearing.
And I want to take you into that moment. My question was the last question of the hearing. The most junior member of the committee yielded me her remaining three minutes. And I had asked questions earlier in the hearing, going back and forth with the president of Harvard, now former president, and I wasn't getting direct answers. So when thinking through the last question, which was not pre-written, I wrote down in pencil right ahead of time and thought to myself, 'how can I ask this in a straightforward, moral way to force them to answer correctly?' And that question was: "Does calling for the genocide of Jews violate your university's code of conduct on bullying and harassment?"
And one after the other, after the other answered 'It depends on the context.' And the world heard. Let me tell you: it does not depend on the context.
And over the years, I've been in a lot of high profile committee hearings over the years, and I've never witnessed the moral bankruptcy and depravity of witnesses like I did in that hearing. In one week, there were over one billion views worldwide. It is now well into the multiple billions. And there is a reason that it is the most viewed testimony in the history of the United States Congress. And that is because it exposed the moral rot at the highest levels of these so-called 'elite' universities. And as I said after the resignations: two down, so many to go.
That hearing set off an earthquake. Their disgraceful attempt to contextualize genocide of Jews is a symptom of decades of moral decay, intellectual laziness, and dangerous radical groupthink at these so-called 'elite' institutions across society. We have put colleges and universities on notice and expanded this investigation to ensure every Jewish and Israeli student, faculty member, and staff member is protected on campus. We're looking at foreign donations to universities, the failure to protect Jewish students, the federal accreditation system, the assault on viewpoint diversity and free speech, the antisemitism inherent in woke DEI, the erosion in academic integrity, and the extent to which U.S. taxpayers have been forced to bankroll the political indoctrination of young Americans at these institutions.
The days of unchecked antisemitism, of anti-Jewish racism, must be over. We will hold the purveyors of the oldest hatred accountable.
Ladies and gentlemen, this visit has renewed my sense of the stakes of the battle we are in. I want to leave you with one message today, it's this: The majority of Americans support you and we always will. Since President Truman's recognition of Israel 11 minutes after David Ben-Gurion declared Israel's independence 76 years and 5 days ago, America stands with Israel.
We must not let the extremism in so-called 'elite' corners conceal the deep, abiding love for Israel among the American people. Most Americans feel a strong connection to your people. They have opened their hearts to you in this dark hour.
And I have seen it everywhere: in conversations with my constituents - hardworking families, small businesspeople, farmers, veterans, seniors, and students alike.
And the reason for this love is no mystery to me.
I was raised in Upstate New York, I attended an all-girls day school right next door to a synagogue. I grew up attending b'nai mitzvot of childhood and family friends and have been welcomed into many homes for Shabbat dinner. I've celebrated with my friends the birth of their children, attending baby namings and bri-tote, and signing a ketubah at a friend's wedding.
My love and respect for the Jewish people and the people of Israel is lifelong and deep.
And I have been to Israel many times - even before I was a Member of Congress. As a Harvard undergraduate, I made my first trip to Israel to study national security policy on a fellowship with the Foundation for Defense of Democracies. And I am pleased to say that I have been many times since-most recently, returning as a Member of Congress in May of last year to help lead an Intelligence Committee delegation meeting with Prime Minister Netanyahu. During each and every visit to Israel, I am reminded of the fundamental fact that our peoples share an enduring bond, forged over centuries.
Both Jefferson and Lincoln called America, in one way or another, 'the last best hope on earth.' When I come here, to Jerusalem, I sense a shared destiny, one embedded in your national anthem, "Hatikvah" - 'the hope.' Israel is indeed a miracle, an outpost of freedom, of Western values, of civilization, a striking example of human potential, the physical embodiment of Herzl's maxim: 'If you will it, it is no dream.' It's this same founding ethos that we prize in America - The American Dream, which says that with hard work, the right values, you can build a life for yourself, your family, and your community. Herzl's Dream and the American Dream. These dreams are precious and we must cherish, protect, and fight for them.
We know we have some difficult days ahead to ensure this always remains true. Prime Minister Netanyahu recently said that if Israel must stand alone, it will. I am here to tell you that it is our duty as Americans that Israel does not stand alone.
We must never let Israel stand alone.
I am confident, in the end, that our relationship will not just endure but emerge stronger than ever before. Israel, keep fighting. We are with you. God Bless Israel and God Bless the United States of America. Thank you for this tremendous honor."
***
Original text here: https://stefanik.house.gov/2024/5/stefanik-delivers-historic-address-on-antisemitism-and-u-s-support-for-israel-at-israeli-knesset
ICYMI: Stefanik Delivers Address at Knesset, Meets with Senior Israeli Officials, Hostage Families, and Visits Historic City of David
WASHINGTON, May 19 -- Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-New York, issued the following news release:Jerusalem, Israel - Today, House Republican Conference Chairwoman Elise Stefanik delivered an address in the Knesset at the invitation of Speaker of the Knesset Amir Ohana. Following the address she met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog, Speaker Ohana, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz, and families of those still held hostage by Hamas to discuss the American people's steadfast support for Israel and the Americans and Israelis still held hostage by Hamas.
Earlier in the day she returned to the historic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 19 -- Rep. Elise Stefanik, R-New York, issued the following news release: Jerusalem, Israel - Today, House Republican Conference Chairwoman Elise Stefanik delivered an address in the Knesset at the invitation of Speaker of the Knesset Amir Ohana. Following the address she met with Israeli President Isaac Herzog, Speaker Ohana, Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz, and families of those still held hostage by Hamas to discuss the American people's steadfast support for Israel and the Americans and Israelis still held hostage by Hamas. Earlier in the day she returned to the historicCity of David archeological site of shared importance to Christians and Jews worldwide. Chairwoman Stefanik is the highest ranking elected Republican and Member of Congress to visit Israel since the Oct. 7 Hamas terror attacks.
Watch her full address here.
"It was an honor to meet with Israeli President Isaac Herzog today. When he visited the United States last year to deliver a historic joint address to Congress, President Herzog shared a message of allyship and the close bond between our nations. Today I'm in Israel during one of its darkest periods in history to share a message of our own: the United States must always stand with Israel," Chairwoman Stefanik said.
"Today I met with the Speaker of the Knesset Amir Ohana to discuss House Republicans' unwavering support for Israel in its fight for survival against the vicious Iran-backed Hamas terrorists. The Biden Administration's betrayal of our most precious ally does not represent the vast majority of Americans who unequivocally support Israel's right to exist and defend itself," Chairwoman Stefanik said.
"Today I met with Israeli Foreign Minister Israel Katz to discuss efforts to safely return the American and Israeli hostages Hamas is holding in captivity," Chairwoman Stefanik said.
"I met with families of the hostages who shared horrific and tragic stories stemming from the brutal October 7th terror attacks. Let me be very clear: We will not rest until the hostages are back home," Chairwoman Stefanik said.
"Honored to return to the City of David today to highlight the incredible archaeological research at one of the oldest cities mentioned in the Bible and a significant site of our shared Christian and Jewish heritage. Thank you Ze'ev Orenstein for the informative tour and gracious hospitality," Chairwoman Stefanik said.
***
Original text here: https://stefanik.house.gov/2024/5/icymi-stefanik-delivers-address-at-knesset-meets-with-senior-israeli-officials-hostage-families-and-visits-historic-city-of-david
Congressional Research Service Issues Insight White Paper on Federal Small Business Contracting Goals
WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Insight white paper (No. IN12018) on May 14, 2024, by R. Corinne Blackford, small business and economic development policy analyst.Here are excerpts:
* * *
Federal Small Business Contracting Goals
Origins
Since 1988, the federal government has maintained annual goals for small and small "disadvantaged" business participation in federal contracting. At that time, Congress required that small businesses receive "not less than 20 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year" and that ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following Insight white paper (No. IN12018) on May 14, 2024, by R. Corinne Blackford, small business and economic development policy analyst. Here are excerpts: * * * Federal Small Business Contracting Goals Origins Since 1988, the federal government has maintained annual goals for small and small "disadvantaged" business participation in federal contracting. At that time, Congress required that small businesses receive "not less than 20 percent of the total value of all prime contract awards for each fiscal year" and thatsmall disadvantaged business (those owned and controlled by socially and economically disadvantaged individuals) receive "not less than 5 percent of the total value of all prime contract and subcontract awards for each fiscal year" (P.L. 100-656). Congress has since increased the small business contracting goal.
Current Small Business Contracting Goals
There are five government-wide statutory small business contracting goals set by Congress:
* * *
Table 1. Statutory Contracting Goals
Source: 15 U.S.C. Sec.644(g)(1)(A); P.L. 118-31.
Notes: Prime contracts are made directly to a business from an agency. Subcontracts are made between prime contractors and businesses. Some federal prime contracts require a contractor to subcontract with small businesses to create more opportunities for those firms. P.L. 118-31, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, increased the SDVOSB goal from 3% to 5%. Executive action increased the statutory SDB goal; in FY2024, agencies must collectively award at least 13% of contract spending to SDBs, per Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-2401, in order to increase this share of award dollars to 15% by 2025.
* * *
Agency Goal-Making
The Small Business Administration (SBA) oversees small business procurement goal-making for individual agencies. It consults with agencies to establish annual goals for small business participation in contracting that collectively add up to the government-wide goals, as required by Section 15(g)(2) of the Small Business Act.
SBA negotiates with agencies to create small business and SDB goals (SBA added SDB goals to the negotiation process in FY2022, per the Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-22-03). SBA sets agency goals for HUBZone businesses, WOSBs, and SDVOSBs at the statutory level; it bases subcontracting goals on recent attainment levels.
Goal Negotiation and Guidelines
SBA's "Goaling Guidelines" describe the goal negotiation process. According to the FY2023 Guidelines, "Before the beginning of the fiscal year, SBA provides agencies with a proposed goal, and agencies respond with an acceptance of the proposed goal or a counter-proposed goal." The SBA will then "determine if these individual agency goals, in the aggregate, meet or exceed the government-wide statutory goals." If an agency and the SBA cannot agree on an agency's goals, the agency "may submit the case to the Office of Federal Procurement Policy at the Office of Management and Budget for resolution."
Aspirational Goal Attainment
Agency goal attainment is an aspirational pursuit without punitive consequences for failure to meet goals. The SBA creates annual Small Business Procurement Scorecards and the GSA produces annual reports, which can attract scrutiny of contracting practices. Any agency that does not achieve a goal must submit a "corrective action report" to the SBA, denoting the reasons it failed to achieve the goal and proposing a "corrective action plan."
Scorecards and Reports
Since 2007, the SBA has issued a Procurement Scorecard for the 24 CFO Act agencies every fiscal year. The SBA gives agencies small business contracting credit in every category applicable to a contract recipient. For example, a contract with a small business that is women-owned and service-disabled veteran-owned would count toward an agency's small business goal, WOSB goal, and SDVOSB goal. The SBA also "double-counts" certain prime contracts awarded in disaster areas (15 U.S.C. Sec.644(f)) and in Puerto Rico and other covered territories (15 U.S.C. Sec.644(x)(1)). Section 318 of P.L. 113-76 requires the SBA to also count Department of Energy first-tier subcontract awards toward small business goals.
In addition to Procurement Scorecards, GSA's annual Goaling Reports, available through the SAM.gov data bank, monitor goal achievement. The Small Business Act also requires GSA to provide a report on all prime contract procurements made each fiscal year. The report must be provided to the President and Congress and made available on a public website. Per Section 15(h)(3)(A)(ii) of the act, it must include "all procurements made for the period covered by the report and may not exclude any contract awarded."
FY2023 Goal Attainment
According to the latest-available Procurement Scorecard, the government reached or exceeded three of five prime contracting goals in FY2023.
* * *
Table 2. FY2023 Contract Awards
Source: SBA, Government-wide FY2023 Small Business Procurement Scorecard.
Notes: SBA excludes certain contracts when procurement data is unavailable or because the work cannot realistically be performed by small businesses. According to the SBA's Goaling Guidelines, most excluded contracts are acquisitions on behalf of foreign governments, awarded to mandatory and directed sources, or funded with non-appropriated, agency-generated funds. Purchases valued at less than $10,000 are also excluded because they are not tracked in the Federal Procurement Data System. The value of contracts with these exclusions is referred to as the "small business eligible" value.
a. In FY2023, they were required to collectively award at least 12% to SDBs, per Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-23-01. In FY2024, they must collectively award at least 13% to SDBs, per Office of Management and Budget Memorandum M-24-01.
b. P.L. 118-31, the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2024, increased the SDVOSB goal from 3% to 5%.
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN12018
[Category: CRSCRS]
Congressional Research Service Issues In Focus White Paper on U.S.-Kenya Trade Negotiations
WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF11526) on May 15, 2024, by Liana Wong, international trade and finance analyst, and African affairs specialist Lauren Ploch Blanchard.Here are excerpts:
* * *
U.S.-Kenya Trade Negotiations
The United States and Kenya began free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations in 2020 under then-President Donald Trump and then-President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. The Joseph R. Biden Administration did not continue the FTA talks; it instead launched the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF11526) on May 15, 2024, by Liana Wong, international trade and finance analyst, and African affairs specialist Lauren Ploch Blanchard. Here are excerpts: * * * U.S.-Kenya Trade Negotiations The United States and Kenya began free trade agreement (FTA) negotiations in 2020 under then-President Donald Trump and then-President Uhuru Kenyatta of Kenya. The Joseph R. Biden Administration did not continue the FTA talks; it instead launched the U.S.-Kenya Strategic Trade and Investment Partnership(STIP) in July 2022. STIP aims to establish "high-standard commitments" between the United States and Kenya on various nontariff trade issues-- including on agriculture, anti-corruption efforts, digital trade, environmental issues, workers' rights, and trade facilitation. STIP does not address tariff barriers, as would a comprehensive FTA.
The Biden Administration has not indicated whether or not it will seek congressional approval for STIP. Congress nevertheless may assess the talks with regard to (1) Congress's constitutional authority to regulate foreign commerce; (2) continuing congressional oversight of the negotiations; (3) the agreement's potential effects on the U.S. economy, and trade and foreign policy implications; and (4) statutory mandates in the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA, P.L. 106-200, as amended) directing the President to seek FTAs in Africa.
Kenya is not a major U.S. trade partner in global terms, but it is one of Africa's most dynamic economies and the second-largest beneficiary of AGOA by value of eligible U.S. imports, excluding crude oil. Increased trade is a key bilateral priority. The U.S. government also views Kenya as a strategic partner in the region more broadly; Kenya is a major beneficiary of U.S. security and foreign assistance, acts as a hub for U.S. security initiatives in the region, and hosts the largest U.S. embassy in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). President Biden will host Kenyan President William Ruto for a State Visit on May 23.
U.S.-Kenya Economic Ties
In the decade prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, Kenya achieved an average annual GDP growth rate above 5%. At the same time, it remains a lower middle-income country, with GDP per capita under $2,300, and more than 80% of employment in the informal sector. According to International Monetary Fund estimates, the economy grew by 5.5% in 2023 and is projected to expand by 5% in 2024. Despite a return to pre-pandemic levels of growth, potential long-term effects of pandemic-related setbacks in childhood education and its impact on human capital development remain a major concern. As of 2022, roughly 38% of Kenya's population of 57 million was age 14 or younger, suggesting a coming surge in the labor force that presents both challenges and opportunities.
Kenya's economic relationship with the United States centers on trade in goods. (Official data on trade in services is not available.) Nearly all bilateral investment activity is U.S. foreign direct investment in Kenya, valued at $277 million in 2022. Foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms employed 4,300 people in Kenya in 2021 (latest data available), with total sales of $2.3 billion.
Kenya is a relatively small trading partner for the United States (94th largest in 2023), but the United States is a major trading partner for Kenya (4th largest) and the fifth-largest single export market, accounting for 6% of Kenya's exports. In contrast, Kenya's largest overall trading partner, China, accounted for 18% of Kenya's reported imports ($3.2 billion of $19 billion) and 3% of Kenya's exports in 2023 ($207 million of Kenya's reported $7.1 billion total). In 2023, the United States had a goods trade deficit with Kenya; U.S. exports totaled $443 million and imports $895 million. Top U.S. exports were petroleum products ($100 million), chemicals ($68 million), and aerospace and related parts ($40 million). Imports consisted mostly of apparel ($472 million), pharmaceuticals ($200 million), and fruits and tree nuts ($92 million). U.S. imports from Kenya have grown by 10% annually, on average, since 2001, when AGOA's tariff benefits took effect (Figure 1).
* * *
Figure 1. U.S. Goods Imports from Kenya
Source: CRS; data from U.S. International Trade Commission.
* * *
Tariff Rates and Other Trade Restrictions
As the United States and Kenya are both members of the World Trade Organization (WTO), trade between them is governed by their WTO commitments, including reciprocal most-favored nation (MFN) tariff rates, which also apply to all other WTO members. The United States also provides unilateral duty-free treatment to most Kenyan exports through the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and AGOA. Both programs require congressional reauthorization every few years. GSP lapsed at the end of 2020, and AGOA is set to expire at the end of September 2025. AGOA countries maintain access to both programs, even though GSP authorization expired.
Kenya is a member of the East African Community (EAC) customs union and shares a common external tariff schedule with the other EAC members, though it applies its own tariff rates on some products. Other EAC members are Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda. The United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement with the EAC in 2008.
U.S. Tariffs. In 2023, around 56% of U.S. imports from Kenya entered duty-free under AGOA. Remaining imports were largely duty-free under GSP or on an MFN basis. The U.S. average effective applied tariff (total duties divided by imports) on Kenyan imports was 0.3% in 2023.
Kenya's Tariffs. Kenya's average applied MFN tariff rate for all partners was 14.3% in 2022 (latest WTO data available). Several top U.S. exports, such as machinery and aircraft face low or zero tariffs. Kenya's agriculture sector presents the highest barriers to U.S. exports, with an average tariff of 24.5%, and relatively high tariffs on dairy (53.1%), animal products (30%), and cereals (28.1%).
Other Barriers. The U.S. government identified certain nontariff barriers (NTBs) as ongoing concerns for U.S. businesses, including Kenya's complex import requirements for agricultural products and inefficient customs procedures. Opaque rules under Kenya's 2019 Data Protection Act also potentially create uncertainties for cross-border data flows. Additionally, Kenya is not a member of the WTO Government Procurement Agreement, and its government grants exclusive preference to Kenyan companies for procurements under roughly $340,000.
Motivations for Trade Talks
For the United States, a final STIP agreement could enhance U.S.-Kenya trade relations by addressing NTBs, and it could become a model for future U.S. efforts to expand ties with trading partners in Africa. Reducing NTBs could lower costs for U.S. businesses and help U.S. firms maintain their competitiveness in the Kenyan market, especially given Kenya's new trade agreements with the United Kingdom (UK, effective since 2021) and the European Union (EU, ratified by both parties as of April 2024), both of which lower tariffs. A U.S.-Kenya trade agreement could help foster economic growth in both countries and encourage Kenya's efforts to continue to improve its business environment and domestic economic reforms. U.S. officials may also see the trade talks as a strategic tool to counter growing Chinese influence on the continent.
Reportedly, the Kenyan government sees the STIP as a complement to AGOA and a stepping stone for a potential comprehensive FTA in the future. Kenyan officials may also seek to bolster Kenya's strategic relationship with the United States, potentially boosting its position vis-a-vis regional rivals.
Key Issues for STIP Talks
The significant economic development disparities between the United States and Kenya may affect their respective priorities. The U.S. government may seek to negotiate commitments close to those in comprehensive FTAs it has with relatively more developed countries. This could present challenges for the Kenyan government, which faces domestic pressure to maintain protections for import-sensitive and nascent industries. Potentially contentious topics include rules on agriculture, investment, and data flows, as well as labor and environmental protections. STIP talks may need to maintain clear negotiating parameters throughout the process to set expectations for the United States and Kenya. In 2006, U.S. FTA talks with the South African Customs Union - the only other U.S. FTA negotiations attempted to date in SSA - were suspended, due in part to divergent views over scope.
Moving Beyond Nontariff Barriers
While the STIP is not slated to address tariff barriers, some U.S. and Kenyan businesses support the inclusion of tariffs. For example, the U.S. agriculture industry asserts that Kenyan tariffs on agricultural products will continue to hinder U.S. market access even if NTB concerns are addressed. Meanwhile, Kenyan exporters have expressed interest in gaining permanent market access to the United States under a comprehensive FTA, rather than preferential benefits provided under AGOA and GSP. Some analysts note that Kenya's benefits of entering into an FTA with the United States may not be greater than those it currently enjoys under AGOA, especially for textile and apparel products. Kenya qualifies for AGOA's third-country fabric rule, which allows Kenya the flexibility to export apparel made with imported fabrics to the United States duty-free. In 2023, nearly all U.S. apparel imports from Kenya under AGOA were assembled from third-country fabrics. By contrast, U.S. FTAs typically require local or U.S. sourcing of yarns and fabrics to qualify for duty-free treatment.
Relation to African Regional Trade Initiatives
Kenya's membership in the EAC and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), and U.S. efforts to support these regional initiatives, are also likely to factor in trade talks. Kenya's EAC commitments affect its external trade policy and negotiating positions. A U.S.-Kenya agreement could affect regional trade patterns and set precedents for regional trade and investment rules. Similar issues apply regarding the AfCFTA, an Africa-wide trade agreement that took effect in January 2021.
Timeline and Next Steps
The United States and Kenya held the third round of negotiations in April 2024, focusing on proposed texts concerning agricultural, environment, and workers' rights. The next round of negotiations was held May 13-17, 2024. President Biden and President Ruto are expected to discuss trade and investment issues during the State Visit in late May. USTR has not confirmed a timeline for completing STIP negotiations.
Issues for Congress
The STIP negotiations are the only known prospectively binding trade negotiations the United States is pursuing in Africa, though some Members of Congress have raised concerns with the enforceability of such an agreement without a strong dispute settlement mechanism. As it has with some of the Biden Administration's other trade initiatives, Congress may seek to engage in the process, given its historical role of authorizing and implementing trade agreements through legislation. USTR briefed congressional staff during the latest round of negotiations. Congress may continue to urge the Administration to consult, collaborate, and maintain transparency with Congress on STIP negotiating goals and process. Congress may also consider how STIP could support regional integration efforts and U.S. economic interests; and the potential types of support (e.g., trade capacity building funds) and flexibilities (e.g., phasing in of commitments) to potentially include given Kenya's level of development.
Also see CRS In Focus IF10168, Kenya and CRS In Focus IF10149, African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA).
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11526
[Category: CRSCRS]
Congressional Research Service Issues In Focus White Paper on Offshore Energy Agency Appropriations, FY2024
WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF12542) on May 17, 2024, by natural resources policy specialist Laura B. Comay.Here are excerpts:
* * *
Offshore Energy Agency Appropriations, FY2024
Three entities in the Department of the Interior (DOI) share responsibility for managing the nation's ocean energy resources on almost 2.5 billion acres of the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) administers offshore energy leasing and mineral development; the Bureau of Safety and Environmental ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF12542) on May 17, 2024, by natural resources policy specialist Laura B. Comay. Here are excerpts: * * * Offshore Energy Agency Appropriations, FY2024 Three entities in the Department of the Interior (DOI) share responsibility for managing the nation's ocean energy resources on almost 2.5 billion acres of the U.S. outer continental shelf (OCS). The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management (BOEM) administers offshore energy leasing and mineral development; the Bureau of Safety and EnvironmentalEnforcement (BSEE) oversees offshore operational safety and environmental protection; and the Office of Natural Resources Revenue (ONRR) manages public revenues from federally regulated offshore and onshore energy and natural resource projects. BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR receive appropriations in the annual Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies appropriations bill. Issues include determining the aggregate and program-level appropriations for each entity and considering certain Biden Administration proposals.
P.L. 118-42, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, was enacted on March 9, 2024, with FY2024 appropriations for BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR. Because appropriations were not enacted by the start of the fiscal year, several continuing resolutions had earlier provided appropriations at FY2023 levels. Earlier House and Senate bills with FY2024 appropriations for the three entities included H.R. 4821 (H.Rept. 118-155), passed by the House on November 3, 2023, and S. 2605 (S.Rept. 118-83), reported by the Senate Committee on Appropriations on July 27, 2023.
Total budget authority for BOEM and BSEE includes both discretionary appropriations and offsetting collections derived from a portion of OCS rental receipts, costrecovery fees, and (for BSEE) inspection fees. The discretionary appropriations for each fiscal year are reduced by the amount of eligible fees and receipts collected, so that the final amount appropriated to each agency is the net of those collections. Discussions of account- and activity-level funding in the sections below refer to total budget authority, regardless of offsets. ONRR's funding does not include offsetting collections.
BOEM Appropriations
The Biden Administration requested $268.2 million in total budget authority for BOEM for FY2024 (Table 1). This would have been a 22% increase over total FY2023 budget authority of $220.0 million. P.L. 118-42 provided $211.2 million in total FY2024 budget authority for BOEM, 4% less than the FY2023 total budget authority and 21% less than requested by the Administration. House-passed H.R. 4821 would have provided $182.0 million, and Senate committee-reported S. 2605 contained $220.0 million.
BOEM's funding is contained in a single budget account, titled Ocean Energy Management. Within this account, the Conventional Energy activity ($61.5 million FY2023; $72.3 million FY2024 requested; $59.0 million enacted) funds administration of oil and gas leasing, including development of five-year leasing programs. The joint explanatory statement for P.L. 118-42 directs BOEM to use at least $2.0 million from the Conventional Energy and Environmental Assessment budget activities for work on geologic carbon sequestration and directs BOEM to prioritize finalizing regulations on this topic.
The Renewable Energy activity ($42.8 million FY2023; $64.5 million FY2024 requested; $41.1 million enacted) supports BOEM's management of renewable ocean energy resources. BOEM had requested increased funding to grow permitting workforce capacity, initiate renewable energy leasing activities offshore of U.S. territories, and automate information management.
The Environmental Assessment activity ($82.4 million FY2023; $92.8 million FY2024 requested; $79.1 million enacted) supports BOEM's responsibilities for assessing the environmental impacts of ocean energy activities to inform planning and policy decisions. BOEM had requested increases for its Environmental Studies Program, for development of an offshore carbon sequestration program, for a team to address renewable energy environmental reviews, and for tribal co-stewardship.
* * *
Table 1. BOEM, BSEE, and ONRR Appropriations, FY2023 and FY2024 ($ millions)
Sources and Notes: H.Rept. 118-155, S.Rept. 118-83, and joint explanatory statement for P.L. 118-42. Net appropriations reflect estimated reductions to discretionary appropriations from offsetting collections.
* * *
BOEM's Marine Minerals activity ($14.4 million FY2023; $16.4 million FY2024 requested; $13.8 million enacted) supports management of offshore non-energy minerals, particularly sand and gravel, as well as BOEM's assessment of critical minerals on the OCS. BOEM had requested increased funds for its National Offshore Sand Inventory.
The Executive Direction activity ($18.9 million FY2023; $22.3 million FY2024 requested; $18.1 million enacted) covers leadership, budgeting, technology, and related activities. The requested increase was primarily to enhance program support for the Administration's clean energy priorities.
Net of estimated offsetting collections, BOEM's FY2024 request was $212.2 million, 16% more than the net appropriation of $183.0 million for BOEM in FY2023. P.L. 118-42 provided $155.2 million as the net appropriation, 15% less than FY2023. The greater percentage decrease from FY2023 in the net appropriation (-15%) versus the total budget authority discussed above (-4%) reflects that BOEM anticipates more in offsetting rental receipts for FY2024 than were collected in FY2023.
BSEE Appropriations
The Administration requested $270.6 million in total budget authority for BSEE for FY2024, an 18% increase compared with the FY2023 total budget authority of $229.0 million (Table 1). P.L. 118-42 provided BSEE with total FY2024 budget authority of $220.4 million, 4% less than FY2023 and 19% less than requested. House-passed H.R. 4821 would have provided $225.1 million, and Senate committee-reported S. 2605 contained $229.0 million.
BSEE's funding is appropriated under two budget accounts, Offshore Safety and Environmental Enforcement (OSEE) and Oil Spill Research. Under the OSEE account, the Operations, Safety, and Regulation activity ($166.9 million FY2023; $178.5 million FY2024 requested; $160.3 million enacted) supports BSEE's development of regulations and safety standards, review and approval of OCS operating permits, inspections of facilities and equipment, and oversight of operator safety programs, among other activities. BSEE had sought a funding increase to build its carbon sequestration program, as authorized in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58).
The Environmental Enforcement activity ($5.9 million FY2023; $7.4 million FY2024 requested; $5.6 million enacted) supports BSEE's compliance with environmental statutes and its oversight and enforcement of environmental compliance by operators on the OCS. A portion of BSEE's requested increase was for tribal engagement.
The activities for Administrative Operations ($19.3 million FY2023; $19.2 million FY2024 requested; $18.5 million enacted) and Executive Direction ($18.8 million FY2023; $20.4 million FY2024 requested; $18.0 million enacted) fund a range of administrative services as well as BSEE's executive offices. BSEE's request had included increased funding for zero-emission vehicles and information technology enhancements.
BSEE's Offshore Decommissioning activity ($3.0 million FY2023; $30.0 million FY2024 requested; $2.9 million enacted) was established as a separate line item in FY2022, supporting closure and removal of offshore energy infrastructure when leases reach the end of their lifetimes.
BSEE had requested $30.0 million for FY2024 to "properly plug and abandon" orphaned wells and pipelines for which no liable party is available to decommission. In the past, appropriators have expressed opposition to decommissioning costs being borne by taxpayers.
The second BSEE account, Oil Spill Research ($15.1 million FY2023, FY2024 requested, and enacted), funds research and planning for oil spill responses and supports Ohmsett, the National Oil Spill Response Research and Renewable Energy Test Facility.
BSEE's requested net appropriation after offsetting collections was $198.6 million, 15% more than the FY2023 net appropriation of $172.0 million. P.L. 118-42 provided $154.4 million as the net FY2024 appropriation, 10% less than FY2023.
ONRR Appropriations
ONRR, which manages revenues from both offshore and onshore energy, is funded within the broader appropriation for DOI's Department-Wide Programs. For FY2024, the Administration requested $185.4 million for ONRR, a 6% increase over the FY2023 funding of $174.9 million (Table 1). The requested increase was mainly to strengthen auditing and compliance and expand solicitor staff. P.L. 118-42 provided $167.9 million, 9% less than requested and 4% less than FY2023.
General Provisions
P.L. 118-42 included a general provision (Section 123) establishing a new Treasury account for bond forfeitures, bankruptcy distributions, and settlements related to offshore decommissioning, which both BOEM and BSEE may use as mandatory spending (i.e., "without further appropriation or fiscal year limitation") to perform decommissioning work. BOEM had requested the account's establishment to facilitate the transfer of decommissioning funds between BOEM and BSEE.
BSEE's budget proposed a general provision that would raise inspection fees to adjust for inflation and would change facility inspection fees from a per-year to a per-visit basis. P.L. 118-42 did not include the requested changes.
Additional Reading
For a broader overview of FY2024 Interior appropriations, see CRS Report R47664, Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies: Overview of FY2024 Appropriations.
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF12542
[Category: CRSCRS]
Congressional Research Service Issues In Focus White Paper on International Trade & Jobs
WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF10161) on May 17, 2024.The white paper is written by international trade and finance specialists Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Andres B. Schwarzenberg and M. Angeles Villarreal.
Here are excerpts:
* * *
International Trade and Jobs
The 118th Congress is engaged in a range of legislative and oversight activities related to trade. The impact of trade agreements on U.S. jobs has been a key, long-standing policy consideration for Members of Congress. There is broad consensus among economists ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF10161) on May 17, 2024. The white paper is written by international trade and finance specialists Danielle M. Trachtenberg, Andres B. Schwarzenberg and M. Angeles Villarreal. Here are excerpts: * * * International Trade and Jobs The 118th Congress is engaged in a range of legislative and oversight activities related to trade. The impact of trade agreements on U.S. jobs has been a key, long-standing policy consideration for Members of Congress. There is broad consensus among economiststhat, in the aggregate, the economic benefits of trade, such as lower prices and a greater variety of goods and services, outweigh the costs. Because the gains from trade tend to be more widely dispersed than the losses, the benefits are often not readily apparent or well quantified. Affected stakeholders often point to offshoring, job losses, stagnant wages, and rising inequality among some groups as indicators of the costs of trade agreements. There is also broad consensus among economists that factors other than trade, such as the adoption of new technologies, affect jobs and wages, and that the impact of trade agreements can be difficult to disentangle from that of other factors.
The economic impact of trade agreements on jobs is widely debated among Members of Congress, academics, and civil society. Multiple government agencies produce estimates of the impact of trade on jobs to inform policymaking. Congress may weigh the relationship between international trade and employment in its trade policy and oversight decisions, particularly with respect to the agencies responsible for economic analysis of trade agreements and the programs that provide trade adjustment assistance for firms, workers, and farmers.
Estimating the Impact of Trade on Jobs
Economists and government agencies use economic models to estimate the impact of trade on the economy (see text box). Estimates from these models inform policymakers' evaluations of trade policy. Despite some limitations, models provide policymakers with estimated impacts on industries, including output, employment, and wages.
* * *
International Trade Theory and Models
Trade models relate firms' supply of goods and services with domestic and foreign consumers' demand based on relationships derived from international trade theory. Models examine how a particular change in trade policy (e.g., the removal of a tariff) affects prices and ultimately supply and demand of goods and services. Trade theory generally assumes that firms adjust their hiring or wages due to these impacts. Estimates of the impact on jobs and wages from trade models are based on assumptions about how firms use labor and other inputs to produce goods and services.
* * *
Trade Agreements and Jobs
In evaluating potential new trade agreements, Congress has considered estimates of the agreement's potential impacts on U.S. jobs. The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) provides advice on trade negotiations and economic analysis of free trade agreements (FTAs). During trade negotiations, the ITC provides a report to the President and Congress mandated under Section 2104(f) of the Trade Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-210) that assesses the likely impact of a proposed FTA on the U.S. economy, including the impact on employment. For example, the ITC's 2019 assessment of the likely impact of the U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) estimated that USMCA would raise U.S. employment by 176,000 jobs and increase wages by 0.27% after USMCA is fully implemented and firms and workers have adjusted to the agreement. In a 2021 report required by the Bipartisan Congressional Trade Priorities and Accountability Act of 2015 (P.L. 114-26), the ITC estimated that trade agreements added 485,000 jobs to the U.S. economy between 1984 and 2017.
The Biden Administration has committed to pursuing a worker-centered trade policy that it states aims to protect workers, drive wage growth, and strive for improved economic outcomes for workers; it has not pursued major measures to open markets or initiated new FTA negotiations. Instead, the Administration has pursued trade initiatives, such as the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF), that focus on specific trade-related issues. IPEF, for example, contains pillars dedicated to building resilient supply chains and fostering investments in clean energy. Quantifying the impact of these measures on trade flows, employment, and other economic outcomes may be more difficult than with past FTAs that have focused primarily on lowering tariff and nontariff barriers.
Jobs Supported by Exports
Broader measures of how many jobs in the U.S. economy are related to international trade may be a useful indicator of how trade agreements that are already implemented continue to support U.S. jobs. The Department of Commerce's International Trade Administration (ITA) estimates the average number of jobs that are supported - not created - by exports in the U.S. economy. The estimate considers the average relationships between the value of goods and services in the economy relative to the average number of jobs that are required to produce that output for each industry, the value of inputs used in their production, and the value of transportation and other marketing services required to bring goods and services to buyers.
As shown in the left side of Figure 1, the ITA estimated that in 2021 (latest data available), U.S. exports of goods and services supported 9.05 million jobs - 6.1 million in the goods producing sector and 2.9 million in services. Among jobs in services sectors, exports supported the most jobs in professional and technical services, 1.4 million in 2021. These estimates represent an increase from 2020 but still fall below the estimates for 2019. In 2020, the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic, U.S. exports decreased significantly, so the number of U.S. jobs supported by exports also decreased.
* * *
Figure 1. Jobs Supported by Exports in Goods and Services, 2000-2021
Source: International Trade Administration.
* * *
The ITA also estimates the number of jobs supported by a billion dollars of exports of goods and services (right side of Figure 1). The number of U.S. jobs per billion dollars of exports has been steadily decreasing over the past two decades, arguably due to higher productivity and advancements in technology and automation that result in the need for fewer workers for every dollar of goods and services produced. The decline in jobs supported per billion dollars of exports became more pronounced during the pandemic, reflecting the decrease in total U.S. exports. This measure shows that a billion dollars of goods exports supports more jobs than a billion dollars of services exports.
The ITA's estimates capture the average number of jobs supported by exports across the economy at a particular point in time. Labor advocates and policymakers refer to data on U.S. jobs developed by the ITA to estimate the impact of changes in trade on jobs, at times not using the data as intended. The ITA has cautioned against using these estimates to assess changes in jobs associated with changes in trade (e.g., assessing the impact on employment associated with the implementation of an FTA that has an impact on trade flows). Although the ITA's estimates have limitations, these estimates provide a bird's eye view into how many U.S. workers are involved in the production of exported goods and services. This may be a useful indicator to consider the scope of potential workers affected positively or negatively by future agreements.
To date, the ITA has not developed an import-focused methodology due to the unique challenges in assessing the relationship between imports and employment compared with exports (see text box).
* * *
Challenges in Estimating Jobs Supported by Imports
The composition of U.S. imports is fundamentally different from that of U.S. exports. While some imports and exports represent clearly substitutable items, which may adversely affect U.S. jobs, other imports represent inputs to further processing or are items that either are not available or are not fully available in the domestic economy, all of which could be complementary to U.S. jobs. While some job losses associated with imports can be highly concentrated, imports also support a broad range of widely dispersed service-sector jobs, including transportation, sales, finance, marketing, insurance, and accounting. A methodology to calculate the number of jobs supported by imports would have to take these factors into account.
* * *
Issues for Congress
Congress could consider legislating or conducting oversight in a number of areas related to the agencies conducting economic analysis of the impact of trade on jobs and the programs designed to aid firms and workers affected by import competition. Congress could consider evaluating the current state of data and analysis on trade and employment to determine how best to improve that data, assess how it can be used to provide more informed estimates on the long-run impact of trade on employment, consider the need for programs to address these potential outcomes, and evaluate how to weigh the impact of jobs against other economic impacts of trade, such as prices. Potential legislative options Congress could consider include the following:
* Requiring the President to develop methods of evaluating the employment effects of limited trade agreements (e.g., IPEF or trade protocols with Brazil and Ecuador), particularly in comparison to FTAs such as USMCA, and report these findings to Congress.
* Directing the ITC to conduct detailed, sector-specific analyses after the implementation of a trade agreement or initiative, such as the ITC's study on the economic impact of the automotive rules of origin in USMCA.
* Directing the ITA to develop a methodology for assessing jobs supported by imports, thus filling a gap in available trade data and helping to inform debates about the interaction between trade and employment.
* Considering whether or not to fund worker retraining programs, and how such programs might be structured. For example, Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA), which expired in 2022, was a program designed to help trade-affected workers adjust to job loss resulting from increased foreign competition. Some Members of Congress have expressed interest in reinstating TAA. The Biden administration also has expressed interest in seeing TAA reauthorized. Studies of TAA have found that while enrolled workers had access to training and reemployment services, the program may not have been effective at increasing incomes or employment.
CRS Research Associate Riley Rice contributed data analysis, research, and writing to this report. James K. Jackson, former CRS Specialist in International Trade and Finance, authored the original version of this report.
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10161
[Category: CRSCRS]
Congressional Research Service Issues In Focus White Paper on Cambodia
WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF10238) on May 14, 2024, by Asian affairs specialist Thomas Lum.Here are excerpts:
* * *
Cambodia
Overview: U.S.-Cambodia Relations
U.S.-Cambodia relations have become strained during the past decade, after former Prime Minister Hun Sen banned the main opposition party in 2017 and as Cambodia's relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) has grown closer. The U.S. government has sought to remain engaged with Cambodia while calling on the Cambodian government to restore democratic ... Show Full Article WASHINGTON, May 19 -- The Congressional Research Service issued the following In Focus white paper (No. IF10238) on May 14, 2024, by Asian affairs specialist Thomas Lum. Here are excerpts: * * * Cambodia Overview: U.S.-Cambodia Relations U.S.-Cambodia relations have become strained during the past decade, after former Prime Minister Hun Sen banned the main opposition party in 2017 and as Cambodia's relationship with the People's Republic of China (PRC) has grown closer. The U.S. government has sought to remain engaged with Cambodia while calling on the Cambodian government to restore democraticrights and resist PRC influence. In 2017, the Cambodian government suspended the annual U.S.-Cambodia military exercise Angkor Sentinel, first held in 2010. In 2018, the U.S. government suspended military assistance to Cambodia in response to its government's suppression of the political opposition.
Politics and Human Rights
Hun Sen led Cambodia for 38 years (1985-2023), including as premier of the Vietnam-backed Republic of Kampuchea (1985-1993). He had been president of the ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) since 1993. In 2023, Hun Sen relinquished his position as prime minister while retaining his leadership of the CPP. In a widely expected move, Hun Sen transferred power to his eldest son, Hun Manet, who was elected to the National Assembly for the first time and endorsed by the body as the new prime minister. In February 2024, the CPP won 55 out of 58 seats in Cambodian Senate elections, which are chosen by local commune council members. The Senate unanimously elected Senator Hun Sen as its president, a largely ceremonial position. The King of Cambodia, Norodom Sihamoni, is head of state and a largely symbolic figure.
Some observers do not expect Hun Manet, a graduate of West Point and New York University, to usher in major policy changes in the near term. Others speculate that the new prime minister, as well as a new generation of cabinet appointees, may reset Cambodia's relations with the United States and the West and usher in greater engagement.
Between 1993, when the United Nations administered Cambodia's first national election following the 1991 Paris Agreements that ended the country's civil war, and 2017, democratic institutions and practices had gradually evolved to allow widespread civic and political participation. The opposition Cambodian National Rescue Party (CNRP) made significant gains in the 2013 parliamentary election and 2017 local elections. Meanwhile, Hun Sen employed a variety of means to stay in power, including through electoral victories, legal and extralegal political maneuvers, influence over the judiciary, broadcast media, and labor unions, and through patronage, cronyism, violence, and intimidation.
In November 2017, the Supreme Court of Cambodia issued a ruling that dissolved the CNRP for "conspiring with the United States to overthrow the government," which the CNRP and U.S. government denied. In the 2018 and 2023 National Assembly elections, the CPP won 125 seats and 120 seats (out of 125 total seats), respectively. The State Department released a statement declaring, "The United States is troubled that the [2023] Cambodian national elections were neither free nor fair" and announced that steps had been taken to impose visa restrictions on individuals who were deemed to have undermined Cambodia's democracy.
* * *
Figure 1. Cambodia at a Glance
Sources: CRS (map) and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 2024.
* * *
In what many observers view as politically motivated actions, Cambodian courts have convicted opposition leader and former CNRP President Sam Rainsy, who lives in self-imposed exile in France, of numerous crimes. In October 2022, Sam Rainsy was convicted in absentia to life in prison, on top of previous sentences. In April 2023, former CNRP Vice President Kem Sokha was convicted of treason and sentenced to 27 years of house arrest. In 2021 and 2022, Cambodian courts tried over 115 former members of the CNRP and other political activists, convicting 67 of them and sentencing them to prison terms of five to 18 years. Many former CNRP members had fled abroad and were tried in absentia. Cambodian-American lawyer and democratic activist Theary Seng is serving a six-year sentence on the charge of treason.
The Cambodian government limits civil society, press freedom, and freedom of expression, including through a restrictive 2017 law on nongovernmental organizations and through defamation lawsuits, disapproval of permits and licenses, and harassment of journalists.
Economy
The Cambodian economy - which was largely destroyed during the leadership of the Communist Party of Kampuchea, also known as the Khmer Rouge (1975-1979), and subsequent conflicts - achieved an average annual growth rate of 8% between 1998 and 2019. The national poverty rate dropped from 33.8% in 2009 to 17.8% in 2019, according to the World Bank, due in part to growth in the manufacturing and services sectors. Following a downturn in 2020-2021 due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the economy has rebounded somewhat; GDP growth was 5% in 2023 and is forecast to expand by 5.8% in 2024, according to the Asian Development Bank.
The United States is Cambodia's second-largest trading partner after China, and its largest export market, purchasing 39.3% of Cambodia's exports in 2023. Cambodian exports to the United States totaled $11.6 billion in 2023 (compared to $12.2 million in 2022), while imports from the United States amounted to $305 million. The largest Cambodian export items to the United States are electrical machinery, apparel, and leather goods, and the largest U.S. export items to Cambodia are vehicles. The garment sector - which is largely run by companies from China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan - forms a pillar of Cambodia's economy, employing over 750,000 workers, predominantly women. Garments, footwear, and travel accessories accounted for roughly half of Cambodian goods exports in 2023.
PRC Influence
China is a large economic benefactor to Cambodia, reducing the relative influence of other foreign aid providers. The PRC is the kingdom's largest foreign investor and a major source of financing, holding 41% of its foreign debt in 2023. China is Cambodia's largest source of imports, including fabric for the kingdom's garment industry.
PRC-backed infrastructure, hydropower projects, and business ventures have delivered some developmental benefits to Cambodia, but also have created or contributed to environmental problems, corruption, and disruptions and dislocation among some local communities. PRC investment has been particularly concentrated in the city of Sihanoukville and elsewhere along the Gulf of Thailand, with development projects including the construction of tourist and gambling resorts, industrial zones, an international airport at Dara Sakor, and a deep-water seaport in Kampot province. Some U.S. analysts express concern that the airport and seaport could be used for PRC military as well as civilian purposes. PRC investors reportedly have left over 500 unfinished and abandoned buildings in Sihanoukville following the halt of construction during the COVID-19 pandemic.
Ream Naval Base
U.S. concerns have grown regarding PRC construction activities at Ream Naval Base on the Gulf of Thailand. In 2022, the PRC began working on upgrades on a section of the base, including dredging to enable it to accommodate larger vessels, a new pier, and repairs to the dry dock. Some experts say China may aim to use Ream to berth PRC military supply ships and accommodate visiting PRC warships, enabling China to project military power further from the Chinese mainland. Cambodian officials emphasize that hosting a foreign military facility would be unconstitutional, although the government may provide port access to multiple countries. PRC officials reportedly have denied that Cambodia has given China exclusive rights to Ream, although China appears to have taken control over a portion of the base, and has docked two naval vessels there since December 2023.
Foreign Assistance and Sanctions
Cambodia is dependent upon foreign aid. Official Development Assistance (ODA) for Cambodia from Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development member countries and international financial institutions totaled $1.1 billion in 2022. The United States provided $98 million in assistance to Cambodia in FY2023, mostly channeled through NGOs. Program areas include maternal and child health, combating infectious diseases, basic education, human rights and democracy, reducing human trafficking, economic growth, and natural resource management. Peace Corps volunteers teach English and train English teachers in Cambodian villages. The U.S. government has provided $208 million for unexploded ordnance (UXO) removal and related programs (1993-2023 data). Cambodia is among the countries most heavily contaminated by UXO left from U.S. bombing during the Vietnam War, the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, and civil wars during the 1970s and 1980s.
The United States has imposed restrictions on some foreign assistance to Cambodia in response to human rights concerns while continuing to provide support to Cambodian civil society. Some observers contend that Cambodian civil society, independent journalists, and urban youth may be particularly receptive to continued U.S. engagement.
Between 2017 and 2023, State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs (SFOPS) appropriations legislation placed conditions on U.S. assistance to the government of Cambodia in response to its human rights policies. Since 2018, the U.S. government has sanctioned five Cambodian officials, and in some cases their family members as well, for corruption and human rights abuses pursuant to Executive Order 13818, which implements the Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act (Title XII, Subtitle F of P.L. 114-328); three of the five Cambodian officials were also sanctioned under the SFOPS Section 7031(c) visa restrictions authority. In 2021, the Commerce and State Departments imposed export restrictions on U.S. national security-controlled items and a ban on arms sales to Cambodia due to human rights concerns.
SFOPS appropriations for 2024 (P.L. 118-47, Section 7043(b)) requires the Secretary of State to submit to Congress an assessment of the extent of the influence of the PRC in Cambodia, including with respect to the purposes and operations of Ream Naval Base. In addition, P.L. 11847 requires that the visa restrictions authority under Section 7031(c) of the act be applied to Cambodian officials about whom the Secretary of State has credible information of having "been involved in the unlawful and wrongful detention" of Theary Seng, and provides $10 million for the Khmer Rouge genocide survivor program out of the Countering PRC Influence Fund (see the explanatory statement to P.L. 118-47, Division F).
For further information, see CRS Report R47311, Cambodia: Background and U.S. Relations.
* * *
The white paper is posted at: https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10238
[Category: CRSCRS]